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IS PENA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO
JUST A DROP IN THE BUCKET OR A
CATALYST FOR IMPROVING A JURY
SYSTEM STILL PLAGUED BY RACIAL
BIAS, AND STILL BADLY
IN NEED OF REPAIRS?
Robert I. Correales*
INTRODUCTION
Historically, race-based jury bias has maintained the most prominent
place in the hierarchy of social ills that have plagued the American Criminal
Justice System. Relying on Due Process and Equal Protection principles, the
United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have chipped away at
the problem with mixed results. State Courts have also served as laborato-
ries, providing important lessons on the successes and failures of different
approaches, often leading the way with their innovations. A formidable ob-
stacle commonly referred to as a "black box," better known as the no-im-
peachment rule, has made progress difficult. The no-impeachment rule was
designed to protect the secrecy of jury deliberations from scrutiny by al-
lowing only limited access to the content of jury deliberations. Its aim was
to promote frank and open discussions during deliberations, protecting all
communications with the exception of extraneous influences like newspa-
pers, threats, and bribes. In Pefla-Rodriguez v. Colorado' the U.S. Supreme
Court finally broke through the black box and delivered on a long-held ex-
pectation that the no-impeachment rule would yield in cases involving overt
statements of racial bias. Pedla-Rodriguez represents an important step for-
ward. Though the decision may not have a widespread impact in a system
where implicit racial bias continues to be the much larger problem, the deci-
sion nonetheless can serve as a catalyst for a new discussion, this time led by
the highest court in the land. And, as history has shown, the decision can
also serve as the ever-important first step forward as the system struggles to
improve its ability to eradicate biases that deny criminal defendants equal
treatment under the law. This article attempts to begin a conversation about
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I wish to thank Professor Thomas McAfee for his many helpful comments on drafts of
this article, and Brianne Perkins, Boyd class of 2017, for her research assistance and constant
words of encouragement. I also wish to thank my research assistant Wesley Su for his hard
work and dedication to this article.
1 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
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the effect of racial and other biases that can work to deny criminal defend-
ants a fair trial. Contrary to the Court's fears that the jury system cannot
survive such attempts to perfect it, the article argues that the eradication of
overt bias on the basis of Equal Protection and Due Process will produce a
system better equipped to deliver equal justice for all, while improving its
institutional standing among the American public. Tracing the Court's his-
tory in similar contexts, and examining the experiences of lower federal and
State courts, the article takes the position that the issue of overt bias will
inevitably be expanded beyond race to protect characteristics such as gender,
religion, sexual orientation, and perhaps political affiliation. Lastly, taking
lessons from the State and lower federal courts that have addressed this is-
sue, the article attempts to lay out mechanisms that will assist Courts
charged with implementing Pedia-Rodriguez.
BACKGROUND
The American criminal jury system is premised on the ideal of an im-
partial group of ordinary citizens who utilize their collective intelligence,
wisdom, and common sense to engage in deliberations that are honest, can-
did, and robust to bring justice to the accused. The criminal jury, despite its
imperfections, is considered a necessary check on governmental power. The
right to a jury trial in criminal cases is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, which, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is applicable to the States. Jury deliberations take place in what is com-
monly referred to as a "black box," which is designed to protect the secrecy
of the deliberations to promote a frank and open discussion of the merits of
the case free from scrutiny by outside forces. In addition to protecting the
secrecy of deliberations, the "black box" is also said to promote respect for
the institution, and public confidence in jury verdicts. Historically, the de-
fault rule has been that jurors cannot impeach a verdict with evidence of
juror misconduct during deliberations absent the exceptions enumerated in
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which codified the no-impeachment rule
of the common law, and its state counterparts. FRE 606(b) reads:
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
about any statement made or incident that occurred during deliber-
ations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote;
or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indict-
ment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of
a juror's statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury's attention;




(C) a mistake was made on entering the verdict on the verdict
form.2
As is the case with all similar state rules, R. 606(b) was designed to protect
the secrecy of jury deliberations to promote an unfettered and frank discus-
sion of the evidence at trial, and to protect the finality of jury verdicts. The
rule was also designed to prevent jury harassment in the form of fishing
expeditions intended to find reasons to challenge guilty verdicts.
Prior to Pedla-Rodriguez, Tanner v. United States3 posed the deepest
constitutional challenge to the no-impeachment rule. In Tanner, the defend-
ants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and several
counts of mail fraud. After the verdict, a juror informed defense counsel of
drug use and intoxication by other jurors. A second juror approached de-
fense counsel, as the case went up on appeal, and made similar allegations.
Both the district court and the appellate court found that R. 606(b) precluded
evidence of jury intoxication to impeach the verdict after the verdict had
been reached. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that jury intoxica-
tion was an internal matter such as an illness, or improperly prepared food,
that may impair a person's focus, or other physical or mental incompetence
not prohibited by R. 606(b). 4 It also held that criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights to a trial by an impartial and mentally competent jury"
were adequately protected by voir dire, observations of juror behavior dur-
ing trial by court, counsel, court personnel and by other jurors themselves all
of which can be reported before the jury reaches a verdict, or, post-trial, non-'
juror evidence of misconduct.6 Indeed, the Court noted that the District
Court held evidentiary proceedings on the possibility of juror impairment
"giving the petitioners ample opportunity to produce non-juror evidence
supporting their allegations,"' where no evidence of juror wrongdoing was
produced. According to the Court, R. 606(b) has traditionally restricted
verdict challenges to situations involving extraneous prejudicial information,
such as newspaper or magazine articles bearing on the case,' and external
influences such as threats to a juror or a juror's family members, or bribes.9
Importantly, while a juror may testify as to any of the offending items post-
verdict, the juror is prohibited from testifying about the thought processes or
the manner in which the prohibited evidence affected the verdict.' 0
2 Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
3483 U.S. 107 (1987).
4 Id. at 122 ("However severe their effect and improper their use, drugs, or alcohol volun-
tarily ingested by a juror seems no more an 'outside influence' than a virus, poorly prepared
food, or a lack of sleep.").
Id. at 126 (citing Jordan v. Com. of Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912)).
6 Id. at 127.
7 Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 117 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228-30 (1954)).
0 See id.
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Judicial concern over statements of racial bias made during jury delib-
erations and discovered post-verdict has a long history," with the majority of
courts that have considered this issue holding that R. 606(b) does not pose a
bar to evidence of racial bias to impeach a verdict (though many have gone
beyond racial bias), and a small number holding that it does. One side of the
debate is represented by U.S. v. Villarl2 where the defendant, a Hispanic
male, was convicted of bank robbery. After the trial, defense counsel re-
ceived an e-mail from a juror (Juror 66), who stated: "I feel compelled to
send this to you, I don't know if I should be doing this but I don't care. I
know it's late but I want you to know that there were a least three people on
the jury who actually listened to the testimony with an open mind . . . We
finally decided to not prolong that young man's hope any longer. We could
have stayed there for another week. Their minds were made up from the
first day. Here is one example, a man said 'I guess we're profiling but they
cause all the trouble.' "13 Based on the affidavit, defense counsel moved to
set aside the verdict on the basis of bias and prejudice on the part of at least
one juror based on Villar's Hispanic ethnicity. 14 The trial court judge denied
the motion. Relying on U.S. v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003), Tan-
ner v. U.S., and R. 606(b), the court held that, though it found racial bias
reprehensible, damaging, and dangerous to the deliberative process, it had no
discretion to grant the motion." The First Circuit agreed with the trial
court's assessment of the limits of its discretion, but reversed on the basis of
a defendant's right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and a defen-
dant's right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. 16
The First Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's reliance on the Tanner
protections, holding that they do not provide adequate safeguards in the con-
text of racially biased comments made during deliberations. The court
stated:
While individual pre-trial voir dire of the jurors can help disclose
prejudice, it has shortcomings because some jurors may be reluc-
tant to disclose racial bias. In addition, visual observations of the
jury by counsel and the court during trial are unlikely to identify
jurors harboring racial or ethnic bias. Likewise, non-jurors are
more likely to report inappropriate conduct - such as alcohol and
Lee Goldman, Post- Verdict Challenges to Racial Comments Made During Juror Delib-
erations, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 4-7 (2010); Jacob J. Key, Walking the Fine Line of Admissi-
bility: Should Statements of Racial Bias Fall Under an Exception to Federal Rule Of Evidence
606(B)?, 39 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 131, 133-137 (2015).
12 586 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2009).
3 Id. at 81 (citing Appellee's Br.App. at 1).
I4 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 84.
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drug use - among jurors than racial statements uttered during de-
liberations to which they are not privy."
While concluding that the trial court had discretion to inquire into jury delib-
erations involving statements of racial bias, the court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court had long recognized that when questions of juror bias are
raised "it would not be safe to lay down any inflexible rule because there
might be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not be ex-
cluded without 'violating the plainest principles of justice.'" IS Importantly,
the trend among courts that had followed the principle cited in Villar far
outnumbered the trend in those which had not."
U.S. v. Benally represented the other side of the debate.20 In Benally,
the 10th Circuit held that R. 606(b) precludes an exception for racial bias.21
Mr. Benally, a Native American, had been charged with assaulting a Bureati
of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous weapon; he was found guilty after
a jury trial. After the verdict was announced, a juror, Juror K.C., approached
defense counsel and informed him that jury deliberations had been improp-
erly influenced by racist claims against Native Americans. According to
K.C., the jury foreman had remarked during deliberations that he used to live
on or near an Indian Reservation, and that "[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they
all get drunk," and that when they get drunk, they get violent.22 K.C also
reported that another juror appeared to agree with the jury foreman. K.C.
also revealed in a signed affidavit that some jurors had discussed "sending a
message back to the reservation." 23 A defense investigator uncovered an:
other juror who appeared to corroborate K.C.'s testimony but had refused to
sign an affidavit. The defense investigator signed an affidavit detailing his
findings. Mr. Benally moved to vacate the verdict and petitioned for a new
trial. The government opposed the motion, relying on R. 606(b). The trial
court granted a new trial, finding that the jurors had lied on voir dire when
they failed to reveal their experiences with and preconceptions of Native
Americans, and that the jury had improperly considered extrinsic evidence
when the juror, whose family was in law enforcement, related stories that
showed a need to send a message.2 4 Addressing the first point on appeal by
the government, the Tenth Circuit followed the Third Circuit, which had held
17 Id. at 87 (footnote omitted).
1s Id. at 84 (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915)).
'9 Id. at 84-86 (citing, United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 n. 12 (2d Cir.1974);
United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. McClinton, 135
F.3d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir.1998); Anderson v. Miller, 346 F.3d 315, 327-29 (2d Cir.2003);
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 225-35 (3d Cir.2003); Wright v. United States, 559 F.Supp.
1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y.1983); Tobias v. Smith, 468 F.Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (W.D.N.Y.1979);
Smith v. Brewer, 444 F.Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571
N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991)).
20 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008).
21 Id. at 1241.
22 Id. at 1231.
23 Id. at 1232.
24 Id.
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that R. 606(b) "categorically bar[s] juror testimony 'as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations' even if the
testimony is not offered to explore the jury's decision-making process in
reaching the verdict." 25 On the second point, the Court held that none of the
statements alleged to have been made constituted "specific extra-record
facts relating to the defendant." 26 Though the statements were deemed im-
proper by the Court, "impropriety alone," the Court observed, did not make
them extraneous. The Court therefore ruled that the trial court judge had
abused his discretion when he admitted that testimony under R. 606(b). 27
On the question of whether the statements evincing racial bias should
fall under an implicit exception to R. 606(b), the Court held that the Tanner
factors already protect the Sixth Amendment interests raised by the respon-
dent.28 Importantly, in response to the argument that Tanner is distinguisha-
ble because racial bias is a more serious and fundamental danger to the
justice system than intoxicated jurors, the Court worried that, once that ave-
nue is opened, there would be no principled way to confine inquiries only to
"the most serious" violations. 29
The Court's longstanding concern over statements of racial bias uttered
during jury deliberations was again highlighted in Warger v. Shauers.3 0 That
case, (a personal injury claim) involved a statement made by the jury
foreperson during deliberations that her daughter had been involved in an
auto accident for which she had been at fault, and that, if a trial had been
held, her niece would have gone broke as a result.' The Court held that the
foreperson's statements were internal to her and thus precluded by 606(b).3 2
However, the Court revealed that under the proper circumstances, it would
be willing to consider the matter in the future. In footnote three of the opin-
ion the court stated:
There may be cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by defini-
tion, the jury trial right has been abridged. If and when such a case
arises, the court can consider whether the usual safeguards are or
are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process. We need
not consider that question, however, for those facts are not
presented here.33
25 Id. at 1236 (citing Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 235 (3d Cir. 2003) (Alito, J.)).2 6 Id. at 1237.
27 See id. at 1241-42.
2 See id. at 1238-39.
2 9 Id. at 1241.
30 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
3 See id. at 524 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a-41a).
32 Id. at 529.
33 Id. at 529 n.3.
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THE PE A-RODRIGUEZ DECISION
In Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado Supreme Court's denial of a challenge to Colorado Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b) where the defendant had alleged that the jury verdict in his
case was illegally influenced by racial bias. Pefia-Rodriguez had been
charged with criminal harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted
sexual assault on a child.3 4 The defendant claimed that he had been
misidentified. 5
Reflecting the nature of the charges, the trial court and attorneys for the
defendant took significant precautions as the jury was being empaneled. Pro-
spective jurors were asked about their capacity for impartiality and fair-
ness.36 In a written questionnaire, prospective jurors were also asked to
disclose whether there was "anything about you that you feel would make it
difficult for you to be a fair juror."37 The same question was read to the
panel and jurors were invited to speak privately with the court if they had
concerns about their impartiality. Defense counsel also asked whether an-
yone felt that this "[was] simply not a good case" for them to be a fair
juror.39 None of the jurors expressed any reservations based on racial and
other bias, and none asked to speak privately with the judge.40 Pefia-Rodri-
guez was found guilty of unlawful sexual contact and harassment, but the
jury failed to reach a verdict on the sexual assault charge. 41 Upon discharg-
ing the jury, the court issued an instruction as required by Colorado law:
The question may arise whether you may now discuss this case
with the lawyers, defendant, or other persons. For your guidance
the court instructs you that whether you talk with anyone is en-
tirely your own decision. . . . If any person persists in discussing
the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service
either before or after any discussion has begun, please report it to
me.42
EVIDENCE OF RACIAL BIAS IN PENA-RODRIGUEZ
After a discussion with jurors and with the court's permission, defense
counsel obtained sworn affidavits from two jurors describing a number of
racially biased statements made by a third juror, identified as Juror H.C.43








42 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
43 Id. at 861-62.
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According to the affiants, H.C. had said that he (H.C.) "believed that the
defendant was guilty because, in [his] experience as an ex-law enforcement
officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe that they
could do whatever they wanted with women."" According to the two ju-
rors, H.C. believed that Mexican men are physically controlling of women
because of their sense of entitlement.45 The two jurors also reported that H.C.
had further stated that "I think he did it because he's Mexican and Mexican
men take whatever they want." 4 6 The two jurors added that H.C. had also
asserted that: "Nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being
aggressive toward women and young girls." 47 The defendant's alibi witness
was not believable, according to H.C., because "the witness was an illegal"
(ignoring the fact that the witness testified during trial that he was a legal
resident, and, more significantly, confirming that the juror was negatively
predisposed to judge Hispanics harshly because of their race, national origin
or ethnicity). 48
The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias, but denied Pefia-
Rodriguez's motion for a new trial. 49 Relying on R. 606(b), the court ruled
that, "[lthe actual deliberations that occur among the jurors are protected
from inquiry under that rule."50 The trial court's decision was affirmed by a
divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals, which held that H.C.'s al-
leged statements were inadmissible to undermine the validity of the ver-
dict."' A divided Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4 to 3 vote relying
on Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) and Warger v. Shawers, 135
S.Ct. 521 (2014), finding "no dividing line between different types of juror
bias or misconduct."5 2 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed, finally fulfilling the long held expectation
that in certain cases an exception to the no-impeachment rule may be
adopted.53 The Court focused on the "imperative to purge racial prejudice
from the administration of justice."5 4 Noting the especially pernicious nature
of racial discrimination in the American South after the Civil War,5 5 the
Court traced jurisprudential advances designed to integrate the jury system
' Id. at 862 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 110).
45 Id. (quoting Brief of Appellant at 109).




'o Id. (quoting App. 90).
5' Id.
5' Id. (quoting Pedla-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 293 (Colo. 2015)).
13 Id. at 863 ("The Reid Court warned that juror testimony 'ought always to be received
with great caution.' . . . Yet it added an important admonition: 'cases might arise in which it
would be impossible to refuse' juror testimony 'without violating the plainest principles of
justice"' (quoting U.S. v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366 (1852))). That sentiment was reiterated later
in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912),
and McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
54 Id. at 867.
s5 Id. (noting that in Texas in the years 1865-1866 the State decided 500 cases involving
prosecutions of white defendants charged with killing African-Americans and all 500 defend-
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to "preserve the right to a fair trial and to guarantee the equal protection of
the law." Highlighting its role in the eradication of racial bias in the justice
system, the Court cited its rulings to: 1) prohibit the exclusion of jurors on
the basis of race;56 2) strike down laws and practices that systematically ex-
clude racial minorities from juries;" 3) prohibit litigants from excluding pro-
spective jurors on the basis of race; and, 4) permit individuals to ask
questions about racial bias during voir dire.6 All of those cases, the Court
asserted, demonstrate that "discrimination on the basis of race, "odious in
all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice."59 Un-
like the case of a compromised verdict in McDonald, drug and alcohol abuse
in Tanner, and a pro-defendant bias in Warger, where each case involved
anomalous behavior by one juror, the Court stated that racial bias is "a fa-
miliar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury.
to the administration of justice."6 0
JUSTICE ALITO'S DISSENT - FORETELLING THE FUTURE?
In dissent, Justice Alito made several important observations. Though
agreeing with the court that "even a tincture of racial bias" can inflict a
great deal of harm to the criminal justice system, 61 Alito strongly objected to
the adoption of a constitutional exception that, as he saw it, would overturn
the no-impeachment rule, undermining centuries of jury secrecy, which, in
his opinion, had crucially protected the integrity of the jury system.6 2 Alito,
argued that the majority undersold the effectiveness of the Tanner protec-
tions when it comes to protecting against racial bias.63 Alito objected most
vehemently to the idea that the new constitutional exception could be limited
to racial bias, stressing that no principled distinction could be made between
a rule targeting racial bias and one targeting other forms of bias.64 Alito
accused the court of declaring that "the Constitution is less tolerant of racial
bias than other forms of juror misconduct," a conclusion that cannot be
squared with the nature of the Sixth Amendment, which protects the right to
an "impartial jury." 65
ants were acquitted) (citing Juries and Race in the 19th Century, 113 YALE. L. J. 895, 916
(2004)).
56 Id. (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-09 (1880)).
5 Id. (citing Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394
(1935) (per curiam); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hernandezv. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
5 Id. (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. 182
(1981); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986)).
5 Id. at 868 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 880-81 (Alito, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Regarding the Court's apparent invocation of equal protection values
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Alito noted that "[r]ecasting this as an
equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting the holding to
cases involving racial bias." 66 "At a minimum," Alito stated, "cases involv-
ing bias based on any suspect classification such as national origin or relig-
ion - would merit equal treatment. So, I think would bias based on sex, or
the exercise of the First Amendment right to freedom of expression or asso-
ciation. Indeed, convicting a defendant on the basis of any irrational classi-
fication would violate the equal protection clause."67
ANALYSIS
The Exception Cannot be Contained to Racial Bias
Though racial bias retains the highest standing in the historical hierar-
chy of social ills that must be eradicated from the justice system, history
shows that concern over other forms of bias such as gender, sexual orienta-
tion, and disability usually follow the progress made in the area of race, as
courts inevitably recognize that those biases can also have a profound nega-
tive impact on participants in legal proceedings who may be just as vulnera-
ble to the whims of a bigoted juror as would a racial minority. The difficulty
of drawing a line that would provide a basis for the distinction between
racial and other types of bias was evident at oral argument of Pela-Rodri-
guez.68 In fact, the Court implicitly recognized that difficulty when it con-
ceded that race and ethnicity are often conflated into racial categories,69 as
was the case in Peia-Rodriguez.
Here it is important to note that the Supreme Court relied heavily on the
experiences of state courts to craft its racial bias exception. During oral
argument, seeking support from the experiences of eighteen state and two
federal jurisdictions that had confronted the question, Justice Breyer asked
petitioner's counsel to explain the approaches taken by the State and lower
federal courts that had considered the matter. 0 In response, counsel asserted
that all twenty jurisdictions had limited their exception to race.71 This point
was later reinforced by counsel for the State,72 and included in the Court's
final opinion.73
Despite lengthy exchanges between justices and counsel for the parties,
a justification for the distinction never emerged during oral argument. In
66 Id. at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 883-84. (Alito, J., dissenting).
6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Pedla-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)
(No. 15-606).
69 See id. at 9-10.
70 Id. at 14.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 29.
7 See Peuda-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
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their attempt to establish a rationale for limiting the exception to race-based
bias, the Justices borrowed from, but did not commit to, Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection doctrine,7 4 leaving several important questions unan-
swered. Though counsel attempted to argue that race-based bias may require
that the Court view the Sixth Amendment through the prism of Equal Pro-
tection," counsel never explained why the entirety of equal protection analy-
sis should not apply to other forms of bias, other than to assert that racial
bias is different because of its uniquely pernicious nature."
Similarly, while asserting that the Sixth Amendment can be animated
through Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection values, drawing a parallel
to the Court's analysis in Bolling v. Sharpe, where, according to counsel, the
Court said that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause should be infused
with the values of Equal Protection,n counsel declined to argue for a full
commitment to Equal Protection. Inevitably, the question remaining was, if
Equal Protection values can animate the right to trial by an impartial jury of
a racial minority, why shouldn't they animate the right to trial of other clas
ses? And, to further develop the analysis along parallel lines, why shouldn't
the First Amendment religious clause animate an individual's Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury to protect against religious bias, or its free-
dom of association clause not animate a similar analysis for political or other
forms of affiliation? 78 Answering these questions in the affirmative, as
would have been the case had the court committed to Equal Protection doc-
trine, would have expanded the exception, while not affecting very many
cases. However, the Court's anxiety over protecting the secrecy and frank:
ness of jury deliberations from a supposedly unmanageable expansion of
those rights prevailed. Not surprisingly, the rationale for recognizing racial
bias while purposely ignoring other forms of bias such as gender, religion,
disability or sexual orientation was never made clear. Time will tell whether
the Court's reluctance to fully deploy Equal Protection was an oversight or
perhaps an intentional and strategic move to lay the first stone in the founda-
tion of a more expansive doctrine.
Pushing petitioner's counsel for an explanation or rationale, Justice Alito
asked at oral argument:
" See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Pedia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855
(2017) (No. 15-606).
7 Id. at 9.
76 Id. at 6.
n Id. at 16. When responding to Justice Alito's question about how the issue of racial bias
connects with the right to an impartial jury, Petitioner's Counsel responded, "Because the
values of the Fourteenth Amendment are read into the sixth amendment as well. And if I can
give the Court an analogy, think of Bolling v. Sharpe, where the Court asked whether the Due
Process clause applies to the Federal government - I'm sorry - the Equal Protection Clause
applies to the Federal Government, which it doesn't by its terms, But the Court said, you know
what, the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment does, and that should be infused with
the values of the Equal Protection. And the particular harms of racial discrimination should be
read into that amendment as well." Id.
7 Note. Alito made a similar point at oral argument and in the opinion.
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Race is - race is different for some purposes. But why is it differ-
ent from other things for Sixth Amendment purposes? What the
sixth amendment protects is the right to a fair trial - to an impartial
jury. And if we allow the exception that you are advocating, what
do you say to the defendant who - the prisoner who is going to be
spending the rest of his life in prison as a result of the jury verdict
that was determined by flipping a coin?79
Justice Alito may have raised the issue more effectively had he used catego-
ries such as gender, disability, sexual orientation or religion to make his
point, rather than an example involving a coin flip which raised the issue at
the extreme end of Equal Protection analysis. However, Alito did manage to
make the point emphatically in his dissenting opinion.
In response to Alito, petitioner's counsel hinted at the possibility of
other exceptions but never committed to that line of analysis. Instead, coun-
sel and other justices continued to develop the idea that race-based bias is so
especially pernicious that it deserves separate treatment even in a non-Equal
Protection context, as, according to them, has been the case in jurisdictions
that have limited the scope of the exception to racial bias. 0 However, a
review of the cases cited for support by petitioner reveals that his answer
was mistaken. As this article shows, State and federal courts have been far
more active and successful laboratories for the exploration of the question
before the court, and can therefore assist to identify possible answers to the
questions left unresolved by Pedia-Rodriguez.
WHAT HAVE STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS DONE WHEN FACED
WITH THIS PROBLEM?
The experiences of state and federal trial courts that have dealt with
overt biases during jury deliberations will be essential to determining the
answers to the questions left unanswered by Peda-Rodriguez. Contrary to
assertions by petitioner's counsel during oral argument that other federal and
state jurisdictions have restricted the constitutional exception to the no-im-
peachment rule to racial bias, examples abound of federal and state courts'
doing far more, often quite successfully. Importantly, the assertion by peti-
tioner's counsel that other jurisdictions have made the change without exper-
iencing a loss of public confidence in the jury, a loss of privacy in the jury
system, or an increase in harassment of juries by losing sides,' though not
based on fact, is nonetheless quite helpful as a baseline for an important
observation. Accepting the proposition that the public's confidence in the
jury has only improved in those jurisdictions that have recognized an excep-
tion for racial bias, an interesting question arises: how much better would the
79 Id. at 15.
so See id. at 9.
' Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870.
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public's confidence in the jury system be if other forms of overt bias were
also eliminated or at least minimized? And, how would it serve the public
confidence in the jury if, upon multiple juror reports of anti-woman, or anti-
religious statements made during deliberations, the judge responded with,
"well, these statements, though bigoted and indicative of a juror's inability
to judge the case on its facts but rather on odious preconceptions about the
individual's membership in a particular group, are nonetheless protected
under R. 606 (b) because they are not about race." Now, what if the bigoted
statements were about a particular religion, which may be fused with a per-
son's ethnicity or national origin, and the juror asserted during a conference
with the judge, "I did not mean the statements as racism, I just did not like
the defendant's religion." Under Pefia-Rodriguez, the judge may be justified
in finding that the explanation suffices to protect the juror's statement from
further scrutiny, to deny a motion for a new trial. Of course, a judge may
also decide, correctly in many cases, that the explanation is simply a proxy
for ethnic or national origin discrimination, which, as courts have noted, 8
are often conflated into race, and decide the opposite. However, how would
that reasoning square with the Court's requirement that trial courts focus on
statements of "overt racial bias?" Lastly, why put the judge into that predic-
ament, when the principled approach would be to eliminate all three forms
of bias that have been revealed?83
An important example and an illustration of the often impossible task of
distinguishing between the interlocking characteristics of race, religion, na-
tional origin, and gender was offered by the Missouri Supreme Court in
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C.4 Fleshner not only teaches about bi-
ases beyond race, but also shows that jurors may sometimes turn against the
defendant on the basis of their prejudgment of a witness (of course, in some
cases, even the state's case may be prejudiced if the jury turns against a
witness on the basis of an impermissible form of bias," and, in some cases,
both parties may be prejudiced if the jury turns against either counsel on that
basis86).
After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the corporate defendant
moved for a new trial because a juror allegedly made anti-Semitic comments
about one of its witnesses during deliberations. The defendant alleged that a
juror, when speaking about the wife of the President of the defendant com-
82 Id. at 884 (Alito, J., dissenting) (recognizing challenge of dividing racial and non-racial
statements).
8 United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988), abrogated by J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (2007) (holding that peremptory challenges based on
gender were racially neutral when the Government exercised peremptory challenges against
three black, female jurors in a case with a black defendant).
84 Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (M.O. 2010).
" Pedla-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870 (finding that a juror had encouraged other jurors to
disbelieve an alibi witness based on "dangerous racial stereotype").
" A juror in a criminal case testified that other members of the jury expressed prejudice
against defense counsel's race with comments including, "I won't let a white man [defense
counsel] influence or manipulate me and I won't do it," and, "We as blacks should not allow
'whitey' to win out." People v. Rukaj, 123 A.D.2d 277, 279 (N.Y. 1986).
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pany, stated: "she's a Jewish witch." "She's a Jewish bitch." "She's a
penny-pinching Jew."8 7 "She was such a cheap Jew that she did not want to
pay plaintiffs unemployment compensation." 8 According to the defendant,
those comments demonstrated that it did not receive a fair trial by a fair and
impartial jury. 9 Noting the general prohibition to juror testimony regarding
mental processes and innermost thoughts or beliefs, the court looked for gui-
dance to jurisdictions that had recognized a constitutional exception to the
non-impeachment rule. Citing the Wisconsin Supreme Court in After Hour
Welding, Inc., v. Laneil Management Co., 90 which had recognized an excep-
tion to racial, national origin, religious or gender bias, the Court held that, if,
after a motion by a party followed by an evidentiary hearing the trial court
finds that statements reflecting racial or religious bias have been made dur-
ing deliberations, a motion for a new trial should be granted.91 Importantly,
that court's focus was simply on whether the alleged statements were made.
The court did not hold a hearing to determine the effect the statements had
on the trial, but held that the trial court abused its discretion by not con-
ducting a hearing to determine whether the alleged comments were made.92
Another powerful example of the alternatives to the restrictive Pefia-
Rodriguez ruling is presented in United States v. Heller,93 where the defen-
dant, who had been accused of tax evasion and making false statements on
tax returns, was the target of discriminatory statements before, and during,
trial proceedings, including jury deliberations. According to a reporting ju-
ror, the jury room during deliberations was "a circus" where derogatory
statements that had been made about the defendant's Jewishness before and
during the trial were repeated during deliberations.9 4 According to the juror,
during testimony one of the jurors had remarked with a smirk, "[h]ey, how
many Kaplans are we going to have here?" In reference to the fact that the
defendant was Jewish. In addition, as reported, another juror mockingly re-
marked that the defendant's Rabbi "came to bless him" (the defendant).95
Both of those statements were made, according to the reporting juror, "to
Gales of laughter," as if the speakers were enjoying seeing the defendant in
such a predicament. 6
In a conversation with the trial court judge, another juror admitted mak-
ing an anti-Semitic slur before trial that he later repeated to several other
jurors during the case.97 Relating the conversation he had with a friend
about the defendant, the juror recalled the following: [friend] "Oh, the Jew-
" Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 88.
88 Id.
89 Id.
"o After Hour Welding, Inc., v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis.2d 734 (1982).
9" Id. at 742-43.
92 Id. at 739.
" United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1986).
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ish lawyer? I said, "yes." He said, 'Well, how do you feel?' I said, 'the case
hasn't been said, but he's Jewish. We are just going to hang him.""
Despite the juror's assertion that he had made the remarks "jokingly" and
assertions by other jurors during interviews that they could nonetheless be
impartial, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded for a
new trial.99 The court found that,
Despite longstanding and consistent efforts . . . to purge our soci-
ety of racial and religious prejudice, both racism and anti-Semi-
tism remain ugly malignancies sapping the strength of our body
politic. The judiciary, as an institution given a constitutional man-
date to ensure equality and fairness in the affairs of our country ...
must remain ever-vigilant in its responsibility. 00
In addressing the manner in which religious bigotry can do damage to the
judicial system, the court stressed, "The religious prejudice displayed by the
jurors in the case . . . is so shocking to the conscience and potentially so
damaging to public confidence in the equity of our system of justice, that we
must act decisively to correct any harmful effects on this appellant." 10 ' Ad-
dressing the juror's explanation that he had simply meant the anti-Semitic
remarks in a joking manner, the court noted that, "in a society in which anti-
Semitism is condemned, those harboring such thoughts often attempt to
mask them by cloaking them in a 'teasing' garb. A wolf in sheep's clothing
is, despite clever disguise, still a wolf." 0 2
State v. Levitt, another case involving religious bias during jury deliber.'
ations, shows the way in which jury bias toward defendants and witnesses
can infect jury deliberations to the detriment of the defense.1 03 The defen-
dant, a physician, had been charged with performing an indecent act upon a
patient.'0 There having been no witnesses to the event, the case turned on
the credibility of the alleged victim and that of the accused, who denied the
event ever took place. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, one of the
jurors informed the judge that, during deliberations, other jurors had made a
number of prejudicial statements against the defendant and his character wit-
nesses, of which there were twenty-five. 05 The juror's affidavit stated that
one of the jurors commented on the defendant's appearance, stating: "How
could anyone go to him because just a look at him leads to the conclusion
that he is a person capable of doing the things that he is charged with." 06
According to the affiant, another woman on the jury agreed with that re-
98 Id.
9 Id. at 1528.
00 id. at 1527.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266 (1961).
'" Id. at 268.
05 Id.
1o6 Id. at 269.
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mark.107 In addition, when the discussion turned to the character witnesses,
the affiant reported that a woman juror remarked, "Did you notice the char-
acter witnesses?" To which a male juror responded: "Yes, characters!"
Then the same woman said, "Did you notice most of them were Jews and
even one of them was from the Synagogue." 0 Importantly, character wit-
nesses take on added significance in cases where the credibility of the defen-
dant can be dispositive. The trial judge ordered a new trial after concluding
that, "[lt]here seems to be little doubt that at least one person on that jury
was affected (by religious prejudice), and it seems prejudicially so and it
makes little difference that the infection was only slight so long as it is pre-
sent."'"" In fact, the court concluded by noting that "[i]f the trial judge
found even one juror to be so biased as to prevent him from objectively
weighing the evidence, it was sufficient to set the verdict aside."" 0
A similar exception was invoked in Powell v. Allstate Insurance Com-
pany,"' a case that dealt with the issue of racial bias but relied on a broader
rule to reach a decision. Powell involved a personal injury claim by a mar-
ried couple who had sued their insurance company under their underinsured
motorist coverage for $200,000.112 The couple were black Jamaicans." The
jury returned a verdict of $29,320 for Mr. Powell, while Mrs. Powell re-
ceived nothing.' 14 Following the trial one juror contacted the plaintiffs attor-
ney and the trial judge to inform them that some jurors had made racial jokes
and statements about the plaintiffs throughout the trial." All the jurors were
white.116 One juror told an "old saw" of a joke that said: "There is a saying
in North Carolina, hit a n****r and get ten points, hit him while he's moving
and get fifteen.""' An alternative juror characterized the plaintiffs as "prob-
ably drug dealers," while others laughed, and a witness was mocked for
carrying a book by Jane Woodall that had a chimpanzee on the cover."' In
apparent reaction to the book one said, "[a]nd Mr. Johnson [the witness]
got out of the car and laid down on the pavement," after which several jurors
went into hysterics."9 Powell's loss of wages and earning power were an
issue at trial. Another juror concluded, "he just wants to retire." 2 0
Stressing that "the issue of racial, ethnic, and religious bias in the
courts is not imply a matter of 'political correctness' to be brushed aside by a
107 Id.
1os Id.
' Id. at 467.
"
0 Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
". Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1995).











thick-skinned judiciary,"'2 1 the Court followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit
which had held in a similar case:
Despite longstanding and continual efforts. . .to purge our society
of the scourge of racial and religious prejudice, both racism and
anti-Semitism remain ugly malignancies sapping the strength of
our body politic. . . . A racially and religiously biased individual
harbors certain negative stereotypes which . . . may well prevent
him or her from making decisions based solely on the facts and
law that our jury system requires. . . .122
Noting the persistence of racial bigotry after over two hundred years of de-
claring to the world that "all persons were initially created equal and are
entitled to have their individual human dignity respected,"'23 the court de-
clared that "[t]he justice system, and the courts especially, must jealously
guard our sacred trust to ensure equal treatment before the law." 24
As the above cases demonstrate, concerns about overt expressions of.
racial and other biases made during deliberations has a long history in the,
lower federal and state courts, many of which have expanded the exception
beyond race to include characteristics such as religion, national origin, race,
color, and gender relying on Equal Protection and Due Process analysis.
Though the state courts and lower federal courts have seldom discussed the
reasons for the expansion of the doctrine beyond race, their opinions demon-
strate the difficulty of confining people and biases to discreet categories.
The decisions also show that by adopting a broad exception courts can pre-
vent cases where permitted forms of discrimination can mask impermissible
discrimination, frustrating the spirit of the exception. Lastly, the decisions
show that protecting broad categories of people who may experience a form
of bias can only increase the public's confidence in a jury system that is
more often criticized for its shortcomings than praised for its effectiveness.
THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORY OF COMBATING BIASES IN THE JURY
SYSTEM PROVIDES SOME EVIDENCE THAT PENrA-RODRIGUEZ
MAY JUST BE JUST THE FIRST STEP IN A MUCH
LONGER JoURNEY
As explained above, to support its decision to tackle the question of
overt evidence of racial bias during jury deliberations the Court traced its
long line of holdings designed to eliminate racial bias in the criminal justice
system. To highlight its role in the eradication of racial bias in the justice
system, the Court cited rulings to: 1) prohibit the exclusion of jurors on the
121 Id. at 358.
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basis of race;I 25 2) strike down laws and practices that systematically exclude
racial minorities from juries; 126 3) prohibit litigants from excluding prospec-
tive jurors on the basis of race;'27 and, 4) permit individuals to ask questions
about racial bias during voir dire.' However, for purposes of this article,
just as important as its observation about what the Court said it did to help
eradicate racial bias is what the Court did not say about its efforts to eradi-
cate other forms of bias, along sometimes parallel lines.
In Batson v. Kentucky,129 the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of
using peremptory challenges to disqualify jurors on the basis of race. The
defendant, a black man, had been accused of second-degree burglary and
receipt of stolen goods.13 0 After voir dire examination, the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to excuse all four of the black persons on the venire,
leaving a jury composed of all white persons.13 ' Defense counsel moved to
discharge the jury before it was sworn, asserting that removing all the black
people from the venire violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the commu-
nity, and under the Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection of the
laws. 3 2 The trial court denied the motion, observing that the parties were
entitled to use their peremptory challenges to "strike anyone they want
to."'33 The defendant was convicted of all counts.13 4 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky upheld the conviction, holding that a defendant alleging lack of a
fair cross section must demonstrate systematic exclusion of a group of jurors
from the venire, affirming its reliance on Swain v. Alabama."' Focusing its
analysis on Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, while virtually ignor-
ing petitioner's Sixth Amendment argument, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed. Overruling Swain to the extent that it could be read to require "that
proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary to
establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause," 3 6 the Court held that,
"[j]ust as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black
persons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqual-
ified to serve as jurors, . .. so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen
on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply be-
cause the defendant is black. 37 The Court then emphasized, "The core guar-
antee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not





129 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13 0 Id. at 82.




135 Id. at 83-84 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
136 Id. at 92.
137 Id. at 97.
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discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve
the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely
from the juror's race." 38
Inevitably, the Court extended its holding in Batson to gender in J.E.B.
v. Alabama,'3 9 a paternity case in which the state had used all of its peremp-
tory challenges to remove males, ending in an all-female jury.1 40 Writing for
the majority, Justice Blackmun declared that "since Batson. . . We have rec-
ognized that whether the trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as
litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are
free from state-sponsored group stereotypes that are rooted in, and reflective
of, historical prejudice."l41 The Court thus held that "gender, like race, is an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality." 42
Importantly, though the Court analyzed the discrimination in the case
through the historical experiences of women in the jury system, it made no
distinction between the histories of men and women, concluding that dis-
crimination in jury selection cannot be condoned against either gender,
thereby targeting for elimination two distinct, and arguably very different,
types of harmful biases from the system of-jury selection.1 43 The respondent
in the case had argued that unlike women, men deserved no protection from
discrimination in the selection of the jury because they were not victims of
historical discrimination.'4 It had also argued that male jurors were more
likely to favor the man alleged to be the father in a paternity action, while
women might be more receptive to the arguments of the woman who bore
the child. Unpersuaded by the arguments, the Court held that, "[s]triking
individual jurors on the assumptions that they hold particular views simply
because of their gender is 'practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority.' "14 The Court worried that exclusion on the
basis of gender "denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror," and then,
distinguishing that type of discrimination from the historical exclusion ex-
perienced by women stated, "and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of ex-
clusion from political participation." 46 Lastly, noting that its holding
possessed the added benefit of eliminating a proxy for racial discrimination,
the Court noted that, "[b]ecause gender and race are overlapping categories,
gender can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination." 4 7
13 Id. at 97-98.
'
3 9 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
14 0 Id. at 129.
141 Id. at 128 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
14 2 Id. at 129.
143 The Court's approach has been criticized for failing to recognize the differences be-
tween men and women and for failing to recognize the distinction between race and gender.
See Roberta K. Flowers, Does it Cost Too Much? A 'Digerence' Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 491.
'"J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141.
145 Id. at 142 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 308 (1880)).
146 Id.
14 1 Id. at 145.
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It is important to note that the fight for gender equality in jury selection
did not originate in J.E.B. v. Alabama. As other scholars have documented,
gender equality in jury selection was first hatched in lower courts, which had
recognized the importance of the issue following Batson, and well before
J.E.B.1 48 Batson and J.E.B. were expanded to include sexual orientation in
SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories,149  where the
Ninth Circuit relied on heightened scrutiny after U.S. v. Windsor,5 0 to hold
that Equal Protection prohibits peremptory challenges based on sexual orien-
tation.'' The state of California has accomplished the same result through
legislation, as other jurisdictions have continued to expand Batson consistent
with the Due Process and Equal Protection doctrines. 15 2
LIFE AFTER PE14A-RODRIGUEZ, AND FURTHER LESSONS
FROM OTHER COURTS
While Peia-Rodriguez stressed the importance of eradicating overt ra-
cial bias from the criminal justice system, it did not provide much guidance
to implement its mandate in the context of jury deliberations. In fact, what
may be construed as the Court's guidance may create as much confusion as it
resolves. Pefla-Rodriguez seems to suggest a mechanism involving two
levels of inquiry at any post-trial proceeding dealing with juror allegations of
racial bias in deliberations. The first level of inquiry would require the judge
to ascertain whether statements evidencing racial bias were made, and the
second would require the judge to determine whether the communications
had a negative effect on the jury's decision to convict. The Court's analysis
is nothing new. State and lower federal courts have followed a similar path
with a few variations for years. Though some courts have proceeded to a
hearing upon finding evidence of overt statements of racial bias, some have
ordered a new trial when the evidence is sufficiently strong, bypassing a
hearing altogether.
The Court's discussion of the types of proof necessary to hold a hearing
and the strength of the evidence a trial judge should consider to determine
the effect of racial bias during jury deliberations was far less clear. Address-
ing the first level of inquiry, Pefia-Rodriguez first warned that "[n]ot every
"4 See Anna M. Scruggs, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Strike Two for the Peremptory
Challenge, 26 Lov. U. L. J. 549, 564 n. 143 (tracing development of Batson doctrine as it
applied to gender in the states).
149 SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471 (2014).
150 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
151 But see U.S. v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to expand Batson to
cases involving the sexual orientation of jurors).
152 See Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corporation, 237 F.3d 556, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2001) (Batson
challenge to exclusion of white jurors); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400. 411-17 (1991) (white
male defendant successfully challenged the exclusion of seven African-American jurors); U.S.
v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 787,797 (1st Cir. 2013) cert. denied, U.S. 134 S.Ct. 1912 (2014) (black
defendant challenged exclusion of Asian Americans from jury); U.S. v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654
(2d Cir. 2003) (expanding Baton to religion); U.S. v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998).
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offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside
the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry,"l53 indicating that
in some cases even statements indicating racial bias or hostility will have a
harmless effect. The Court then held that "where a juror makes a clear state-
ment that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict
a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeach-
ment rule give way on order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence
of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guaran-
tee," 5 4 appearing to focus strictly on unambiguous statements of racial bias.
However, the Court tempered the reference to clear statements when it
stated, "[for the inquiry to proceed, there must be a showing that one or
more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations."' While
the Court's use of the term "overt racial bias"'56 seems to limit its focus to
unambiguous violations, the use of the modifier "exhibiting," seems to al-
low for an examination of content as well as context, and not just shock
value, of the offending statements. Similarly, by alerting trial courts that
such statements "must TEND TO SHOW that racial animus was a significant
motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict"' the Court indicated that
even a small quantum of evidence may be significant enough to justify set-
ting aside a verdict and ordering a new trial under the proper circumstances.
The term "tend[s] to show" in reference to evidentiary proof generally de-
notes a very low threshold, and its use is inconsistent with the Court's use of
more demanding terminology earlier in the opinion. The Court's final word
on the matter only added to the confusion, as it held that, despite its apparent
attempts to provide guidance, it "[did] not decide the appropriate standard
for determining when evidence of racial bias is sufficient to require that the
verdict be set aside and a new trial be granted.""'
WHEN DOES A STATEMENT EXHIBIT "OVERT RACIAL BIAS?
To keep from opening a wider door, the Pefla-Rodriguez Court focused
the constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule on statements exhib-
iting "overt racial bias," while managing not to define those terms. Whether
a statement reveals, or exhibits, racial bias, such that a trial court should be
" Pedla-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
1 Id. (emphasis added).
5 Id.
56 Id. at 859.
5 Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, the statement must "tend to show, that racial ani-
mus was a significant motivating factor in the jury's vote to convict" unnecessarily ignores the
situation where the jury may choose not to convict because of racism. For example, when the
jury turns against an unsympathetic victim on the basis of racial bias, prejudicing the State's
case. Such a case would be a natural offshoot of Pedla-Rodriguez.
" Id. at 870-71, comparing Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159 (inquiring whether racial bias
"pervaded the jury room"), with e.g., Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120 ("one racist juror would be
enough").
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concerned about the speaker's potential to judge a criminal defendant on the
basis of that bias, escapes an easy answer. To determine whether juror state-
ments provide the evidence of racial bias required by the court, trial judges
must analyze not just the content of the statements, but also the context in
which they were delivered. An effective understanding of communications
in their full context requires that the judge be mindful not just of their com-
mon meaning, but also their colloquial meaning, and, at times even their use
as "slang." Simplifying or reducing the statements to their most basic com-
ponents and ascertaining their meaning in isolation will often rob them of
their significance and impact. Instead, the judge should assess the statements
in their entirety, as they were originally uttered, preserving the proper
context.
State v. Brown,159 demonstrates the importance of context. In that case,
the defendant appealed a conviction for simple assault and disorderly con-
duct based on the trial court's refusal to hold a post-trial evidentiary hearing
to determine if the jury was racially biased.16 0 The charges against Brown
arose from a confrontation between several members of the Narragansett
Indian Tribe and the Rhode Island State Police.'"' Brown, a member of the
Indian group involved in the incident, was alleged to have slammed a state
trooper's arm in a door.1 62 He was also accused of pushing, choking, and
being physically combative with other state troopers and flailing his limbs as
troopers attempted to handcuff him.1 63 There were six co-defendants in this
case. 6
In a note to the judge during deliberations, the jury's agitated discussions
appeared to center on the tactics by the police, with one juror refusing to
convict because of the conduct by the state troopers.1 65 A second note asked
for clarification on the issue of self-defense, and a third note declared a
"complete impasse" on all charges.1 66 Significantly, four of the six co-de-
fendants were acquitted of all charges.' 7
In support of his appeal, Brown cited affidavits from three jurors, one
of which, Juror A, identified herself as "the lone minority juror," and stated
that she was "deeply concerned about the bias and conduct" of two other
jurors, Jurors 1 and 2, who, according to her, "appeared to have a joint
agenda." 68 In one incident she described, observing Brown and other co-
defendants rise when the Tribal Chief Sachem testified at trial, Juror 1 re-
marked, "why did they stand up? He's nothing." 69 In addition, Juror A
'59 State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099 (R.I. 2013).
'6 Id. at 1101-02.





6  Id. at 1103.
166 Id.
'
67 Id. at 1105.
168 Id.
16 Id. at 1106.
22 Vol. 21
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado
reported that Juror 2 stated during deliberations, "who are those people to
touch a police officer?"7 0 Jurors I and 2 were also subjects of a second
affidavit, this time by a juror referred as Juror B who corroborated the "who
are those people" response by Juror 2 during the discussions about touching
a police officer."' Juror B added that Juror 2 had banged two water bottles
like a tom-tom drum when the verdict was finally reached. 7 2 The banging of
the two bottles like a tom-tom drum was also reported in a third affidavit by
another juror who termed the behavior of Jurors 1 and 2 "disrespectful"
toward the defendants, but never heard racial epithets."' The trial court de-
nied defendant's motion for a new trial, finding the proffered statements to
be "impressions of opinions or conclusions" based on ambiguous conduct. 7 4
The trial judge found that "none of the jurors had made clear statements
evidencing racial bias.""' Instead, according to the judge, the affidavits
demonstrated statements or conduct that was "ambiguous, innocuous," and
"capable of different interpretations."" 6
On appeal, the State Supreme Court held that a juror's racial bias is not
"extraneous prejudicial information" or an "outside influence" within R-
606(b), but it agreed with the First Circuit that R. 606(b) does not preclude
the admission of such testimony where necessary to protect a defendant's
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury-a right guaranteed by the federal
and state constitutions."'
In upholding the trial court's decision to deny the motion for a new trial;
the Supreme Court analyzed each statement included in the affidavits from
the three jurors. In concluding that no racial epithets were uttered the court
oversimplified the conduct, and the words, of the jurors. The court's analysis
reduced each statement to its simplest meaning, took each statement in isola-
tion, and ignored the context of their occurrence. The statement from Juror 1
was reduced to, "the Tribe's Chief Sachem was 'nothing.'" " Juror 2's state-
ment was reduced to, "Juror 2's use of the term 'those people' in describing
Brown and his co-defendants."7 9 And Jurors B and C's observations that
Juror 2 had banged the water bottles like a tom-tom drum when the verdict
was reached was presented as a mere physical act.8 0 The court seemed un-
willing or unable to consider evidence of racial bias in a contextual manner,
ruling that "according to the affiants, none of the jurors uttered racial slurs,
and none explicitly or impliedly suggested that Brown's racial or ethnic
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guishing the case from instances where courts found clear and unambiguous
statements of racial bias.'82 Finally, while expressing some confusion about
the meaning of the banging of the water bottles as tom-tom drums, the court
nonetheless agreed with the trial court's characterization of the conduct as
"ambiguous," "innocuous," and "capable of different interpretations." 83
The court's analysis of the statements revealed a high level of ignorance
of the context under which they were made. The court's simplified reference
to Juror 1's statement that the Tribe's Chief Sachem was "nothing" ignored
the fact that the Juror's disdainful statement was made following a show of
respect and reverence from the defendant toward their social and spiritual
leader under very difficult circumstances. The juror's statement was not sim-
ply "he's nothing," but rather, "Why did they stand up? He's nothing." 8 4
As such, the statement revealed Juror 1's disrespect of the tribal leader's sta-
tus and disrespect of the Tribe's cultural customs. Reducing the tribal leader
to a "nothing" in the solemnity of a legal tribunal denied his followers their
basic legitimacy by identifying them as followers of a non-entity, perhaps
deserving of punishment for who they were, not what they were accused of
having done. Similarly, the court's characterization of Juror 2's reference to
the defendants as "those people," presented in isolation, ignored the context,
and possible effect, of the disrespect that was shown the tribal leader and the
Tribe's custom when the leader testified at trial. The court's conclusion that
"those people" could be taken as "an acceptance of the state's argument that
defendants had no legal entitlement to lay hands on the officers during the
confrontation,"' first ignores the rest of the statement, which was not sim-
ply "those people," but included "who are those people to touch a police
officer?"'"' The term "those people" can be perfectly innocent in some con-
texts, but, in the context of the case, the term continued the theme that the
Native American defendants were somehow 'the other' who, unlike the pre-
ferred group, were not permitted to touch a police officer, even when the
officer was believed by other jurors to have been the aggressor. Here it is
important to note that other members of the jury resisted convicting some of
the defendants based on the conduct by the police.' Similarly, in the con-
text of the case, the tapping of the water bottles as tom-tom drums is but
another example of disdain for Native Americans. By tapping the water bot-
tles like a tom-tom drum, the juror did not engage in "innocuous conduct"
but rather caricatured and mocked an important Native American tradition,
revealing a cultural bias against its practitioners. Contrary to the court's anal-
ysis, indirect communications about groups that share the defendant's char-
acteristics such as race, ethnicity or national origin, while not directed at the
defendant specifically, will nonetheless reveal biases that may drive the de-
182 Id.
18' Brown, 62 A.3d at 1111.
184 Id. at 1106.
"I Id. at 1110.
186 Id.
" See id. at 1105.
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cision of the speaker, or that will prompt a discriminatory impulse by the
recipients. At times, even an apparently minor or innocuous reference to the
community where the defendant or a witness lives,' 8 or their preferred non-
English language,' 9 may lead the judge to discover more severely offending
statements when an inquiry is made.
IMPACT ON THE JURY
The discussion at oral argument of Pedia-Rodriguez regarding the im-
pact of statements exhibiting overt racial bias on a jury did little to clarify
the matter. The Court's opinion similarly was void of guidance in that area.
At oral argument, counsel for the petitioner made several attempts to re-
spond to the Justices' questions regarding the degree of impact on the jury by
referring to the "hypothetical average juror" doctrine, which, according to
counsel, is followed by several state jurisdictions.9 0 Counsel referred to the
doctrine several times, but omitted the fact that the doctrine usually applies
to cases of extraneous evidence, not cases of racial bias. Regarding the dis-
tinction between statements that would support an inquiry and others that
would not, such as "you know, he's from the neighborhood; I know people
from that - people from that neighborhood would always commit crimes like
that,"'9 ' that could well be challenged as based on race, counsel stated;
"[w]ell, I think the analysis would be similar to what you do under the
Equal Protection Clause, but it wouldn't have to be lockstep. So the question
that is asked in the 20 jurisdictions that already do this is, would a reasona-
ble juror have understood the comments to be about race?" 9 2 Later in the
argument, speaking about the possible impact of the statement on the jury,
petitioner's counsel added, "[at the second step] the judge asks the same
question the judge would ask about other jury misconduct, like extraneous
evidence, the judge asks, is there a reasonable possibility that the verdict was
influenced by the bias?"1 93 However, when pressed by Justice Roberts with a
hypothetical where all jurors agreed on a defendant's guilt despite acknowl-
edging the racially offensive comments, counsel stated, "[s]o I think you've
asked two questions here, the first is, is one juror enough, and the second is,
do you look at the strength of the government's case?" 94 Citing Parker v.
Gladden, Counsel stated, "whether one juror is enough," the Court has
88 For example, sometimes a reference to a place like Watts, or the barrio may be used as
a proxy for racial bias.
1" See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) ("It may well be, for certain
ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin
color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.")
190 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-25, Pedia-Rodriguez, 137 S.Ct. 855 (2017) (No.
15-606).
"' Id. at 17.
192 Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
"9 Id. at 22.
194 Id. at 23.
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clearly answered yes.'19 But then he went on to say that whether courts
should look at the strength of the government's case is an issue on which the
twenty jurisdictions across the country are divided.1 96 A close look at the
jurisdictions that follow the hypothetical average juror standard reveals that
the vast majority of courts to consider the issue agree with Parker v. Glad-
den on the issue of racial bias, while those that have applied the reasonable
or average juror doctrine to racial bias may have misapplied a doctrine for-
mulated for an entirely different purpose, and inadequate for cases involving
race. 197 The "hypothetical average juror" doctrine was designed to assess the
impact of extraneous evidence on a jury.'19 Though it has been applied (or
rather misapplied) to racial bias, 199 it was not designed for that purpose.
State v. Hidanovic2 00 demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the "hypothet-
ical average juror" doctrine when applied to cases involving racial bias. In
Hidanovic, a Bosnian defendant was convicted of engaging in a riot when
armed for allegedly using a baseball bat during a fight involving several
people. 2 0 1 After the verdict, a juror self-reported in an affidavit that she had
bought up the issue of ethnicity when she told jurors during deliberations
that she had experienced negative interactions with Bosnians who had stolen
from her business, 2 0 2 adding that the defendant's and the witnesses' race was
discussed in a negative way.2 0 The trial court rejected affidavits from the 11
other jurors relating their recollection of the racial discussions during delib-
erations, pursuant to N.D.R.Ev. 606(b). 2 04 The court characterized the re-
porting juror's statements as "a change of heart" that went to the jury's
mental or thought processes during deliberations, and as "extraneous and
general and not specific about Hidanovic." 2 05 The trial court deemed the
statements were "not prejudicial, because they would not have affected the
verdict of a hypothetical average juror." 2 0 6
After concluding that evidence of racial or ethnic bias was not review-
able under the state's no-impeachment rule, the State Supreme Court none-
theless analyzed the matter under rules designed to assess the effect of
extraneous information on a deliberating jury.2 0 7 The Court recognized the
"hypothetical average juror" doctrine, citing the criteria developed in
' Id.
196 Id.
' See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 19-20 (Conn. 1998); Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d
917, 920-21 (Del. 1996); Powell v. Allstate Insurance Company, 652 So.2d 354, 358 (Fla.
1995).
' E.g., United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 238 (3rd Cir. 2001); State v. Eison, 533
N.W.2d 738, 745 (Wis. 1995); Zana v. State, 216 P.3d 244, 248 (Nev. 2009).
' Commonwealth. v. McCowen, 939 N.E.2d 735, 766 (Mass. 2010) (holding that a judge
must focus on the probable effect a juror's racial bias had on a hypothetical average jury).
20 747 N.W.2d 463 (N.D. 2008).
201 Id. at 466.
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Brooks for cases involving extraneous information. 208 The court then dis-
cussed the different approaches followed by state courts when statements of
racial bias are a factor in jury deliberations, appearing to agree with courts
that have found an exception for racial bias. 209 Nonetheless, ignoring its own
conclusion that racial bias does not represent extraneous information, the
court deferred to the trial court, which had applied the Brooks factors to the
case, and had found no racial bias.210
The trial court judge had characterized the comments made by the juror
as "of general nature," not specifically related to the defendant, or to Roma
Bosnians.21 1 Citing his faith in the citizens of the state, the judge asserted
that he did not believe that, "a hypothetical average juror would buy into
such type of misstatements of prejudice, race or otherwise."21 2 Significantly,
the trial court had also noted that, though several individuals had confirmed
that the ethnicity of the defendant was brought up, it was brought up only for
a short period of time, and it did not relate to the charge of engaging in a riot
when armed. 213  .
Unfortunately, by resting his analysis on the generalized notion of
"faith in the citizens of the state" the trial judge unjustifiably declared his
state, and, by association, all jurors within it, free of bigotry and beyond
scrutiny. Moreover, relying on the "hypothetical average juror" as the judge
constructed him, ignored the fact that an actual juror confessed in this case
to having uttered the racially or ethnically-charged statements.
As many courts have held, given the high burden placed on the state in
criminal cases, even one juror may be enough to make the difference be-
tween a guilty or not guilty verdict.2 14 In addition, the duration of the offend-
ing statements often has nothing to do with their impact, and the association
of the statement with the charged crime misses the fact that what matters in
the context of a trial is the credibility of the parties and witnesses. Once the
credibility of the parties or their witnesses has been undermined by negative
references to their ethnic or racial identity the party's ability to mount a de-
fense may be hopelessly damaged. Importantly, though the trial court
seemed to admit that the credibility of the defendant can be a factor in a
criminal proceeding, it also argued that it would take a leap of logic to con-
clude that the reporting juror believed in general that Bosnians are not truth-
ful, when, in fact, what is at stake is the credibility of the individual
defendant. The court alluded to the fact that the other 11 jurors had stated in
their affidavits that they had followed the law and analyzed the evidence
208 Id. at 468.
20 Id. at 474.
210 Id. at 474-76.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 475. See also, U.S. v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1886) ("It is
inconceivable that by merely denying that they would allow their earlier prejudiced comments
to influence their verdict deliberations, the jurors could have expunged themselves of the per-
nicious taint of anti-Semitism").
214 U.S. v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001).
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before them when reaching the verdict. 215 However, jurors, and people in
general, when confronted with the issue publicly, are very unlikely to recog-
nize their own racial prejudices. 2 16 Important to this analysis is that the pro-
ceedings in the case had been racially and ethnically charged. During an
exchange with a witness, the prosecutor, over the objection of defense coun-
sel, referred several times to a derogatory term used for Roma Gypsies in
Germany, needlessly introducing the matter of the race of the defendant in a
negative context into the proceedings. 2 17 Curiously, one of the factors in the
"hypothetical juror standard" is an assessment of "how the information is
associated with the crime" which, with the exception of crimes involving a
race component would appear to be irrelevant in all cases where juror racial
bias is uncovered.
Perhaps most importantly, to determine the impact of a statement of
overt racial bias on a jury, judges must first consider the small burden faced
by a criminal defendant when meeting the state's proof, which is simply to
make a case for reasonable doubt. 218 Indeed, courts have rightly held that,
perhaps because of such a small burden, a defendant's case can be com-
pletely undermined by even one juror, whose deeply-held biases render him
incapable of assessing a case on the merits. In After Hour Welding v. Laneil
Management,219 a civil case, Sydney Eisenberg, an officer for the defendant
corporations, which lost the case, had testified at trial. The defendant moved
for a new trial supported by an affidavit from a dissenting juror which stated
that, during the course of the trial and his service on the jury other jurors had
said: "Mr. Eisenberg is 'A Cheap Jew.' "220 Another statement, "Alan Eisen-
berg, Mr. Sydney [sic] Eisenberg's son, defended the outlaws" was said
with a derogatory tone and attitude toward Alan Eisenberg. 221 A third state-
ment reported by the dissenting juror was that "[t]hey (Alan and Sydney
[sic] were involved in the suicide of Judge Krueger," as if they had done
something bad. 2 2 2
Observing that "whenever it comes to a trial court's attention that a jury
verdict may have been the result of any form of prejudice based on race,
religion, gender, or national origin, judges should be especially sensitive to
such allegations and conduct an investigation to "ferret out the truth." 223 The
court ruled that "[f]or even if one member of a jury harbors a material
prejudice, the right to a trial by an impartial jury is impaired." 2 24 Just as
significantly, the court noted that discrimination can come in many forms
215 See Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d at 476.
216 Bryan H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, The Jury Under Fire: Myth, Controversy, and Re-
form 45-47 (Oxford University Press 2017).
217 See Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d at 477.
218 E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
219 324 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1982).
220 Id. at 688.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 690 (citing Morgan v. United States, 399 F.2d 93-97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied




when it cited the long history of discrimination against Jews, reasoning that,
though laws have prevented many forms of discriminatory practices against
Jews and other minorities, subtler forms of such practices still persist, con-
cluding that the negative stereotyping as "evidenced by the juror's affidavit
has no place in our system of justice."225
Commonwealth v. Laguer,226 shows how the biased attitude of one or
more jurors can end up infecting other members of the jury, leading to unjust
results. The Laguer defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, robbery,
breaking and entering, and assault and battery.227 In an affidavit written
four-and-a-half years after the defendant's convictions, a juror stated that he
had voted "with reservation" to convict the defendant. 228 According to the
juror, right after the jury was impaneled, another juror stated, "the god-
damned spic is guilty just sitting there; look at him. Why bother having the
trial." 229 According to the affiant, the juror made specific racial comments
and went from one juror to another using racial overtones to discuss the
defendant's guilt.230 In addition, two other jurors engaged relentlessly in
similar conduct. 231' The defendant's discharge from the Army drew a great
deal of speculation during jury deliberations, with some jurors guessing,
without any evidence having being presented at trial, that sexual misconduct
had caused the discharge. 232 The juror's wrath was also directed at the defen-
dant's alibi witness Miguel Gonzalez, a Hispanic male, who was called a
"goddamned fool" and a "lying son of a bitch." 233 The affiant concluded by
saying, "Had the jury deliberated with all of the evidence, I believe the re-
sult would have been different." 23 4
Though the court agreed with the trial judge that the evidence of juror
bias did not relate to "specific, readily identifiable facts or actions as op-
posed to evidence of subjective mental attitudes on the part of a juror," it
nonetheless noted that racial bias in the jury room might well offend funda-
mental fairness. 235 On remand, the court ordered that a hearing be held to
determine whether the revelations in the affidavit were true.236 If the con-
tents of the affidavit were proved to be essentially true, the court mandated
that the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial.237
A similar effect was discussed in Connecticut v. Santiago,23 8 a murder case
in which a juror offered two versions of a statement containing a racial refer-
225 Id.
226 571 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. 1991).
227 Id. at 372.
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ence made about the defendant. In one version, given to the clerk of the
court, the juror (Brier) stated that: ". . . (3) she had been pressured by the
other jurors to find the defendant guilty; and, (4) on one occasion one of the
jurors returned from lunch and reported conversations that he had heard in a
restaurant in which the defendant was referred to as a 'spic.' "239 In the other
version, presented by the defendant's attorney, Brier, who had contacted the
attorney a week before, stated:
[T]hat one of the jurors in deliberation, a male juror that she didn't
know the name of, had said, in an attempt to convince the other
jurors as to [the defendant's} guilt, the following statements:
'What do you care about a spic? Let's get one more spic off the
streets of Willimantic,' and 'Of course he's guilty, he's a
spic.'. . .And also, He's a spic. He's guilty. One less spic on the
street.' 240
Upon questioning by the court, the juror stated, "we went back into jury
deliberations that day . . . that was the first thing out of that guy's
mouth. . .He's a spic and he's guilty." 241 The trial court summoned the jury
foreman and asked him whether he had heard any of the statements alleged
by the reporting juror.2 42 The foreman responded that he had not heard any
of the statements alleged.2 43 On the basis of the foreperson's testimony and
the behavior of the reporting juror,244 the trial court determined that the alle-
gations merited no further inquiry.2 45  However, relying on its supervisory
capacity, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued guidelines to lower courts
for cases in which jurors report that racial bias was introduced into jury
deliberations by a fellow juror.246
Noting that the trial court's singular focus on the jury foreperson as-
sumed that the statements had been made to the entire jury and were there-
fore audible to the foreperson, the court indicated that the record did not
mention that the foreperson had been present, nor that there was any connec-
tion between the reporting juror and the foreperson. 247 Therefore, the court
concluded that the trial court's decision to treat the foreperson's testimony as
239 Id. at 14.
240 Id. at 326.
241 Id.
2 4 2 Id. at 16.
243 Id.
244 In a letter to the court, sent one month after the jury reached a verdict, the reporting
juror expressed regret for the verdict but did not report any juror misconduct. Instead, the
reporting juror asked for leniency on behalf of the defendant. The reporting juror felt that the
city was better off without the murder victim because the victim had been a drug dealer, and
the reporting juror also indicated that she was close to the defendant's family. Id. at 24. (Calla-
han, R., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245 Id. at 17.
246 See id. at 18-19.247 Id. at 21.
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dispositive was not supported by the content or the context of the reporting
juror's testimony.2 48
The court's guidelines for future cases suggested a more thorough in-
vestigation of the context under which the allegations of bias arise. Simply
focusing on the reporter or the jury foreperson will not yield the full context
of the offending remarks. The court therefore suggested that the trial court's
inquiry include enough interviews to produce not only the reported remarks
but also corroboration from different sources. 249 The court also suggested
that the court's inquiry should include cross-examination of the juror alleged
to have made the remarks, to enable it "to observe the juror's demeanor
under cross-examination, and to evaluated his answers in light of the particu-
lar circumstances of the case." 25 0
Fisher v. Delaware,25' shows how a small quantity of information can
sometimes lead to the discovery of evidence sufficient to justify ordering a
new trial. In Fisher, the defendant was convicted by a jury of possession
with intent to deliver cocaine. 252 Four days after the verdict, the court re-
ceived a letter from the jury foreman in which he stated that two jurors had
said: "this defendant does not have a chance with this jury look there are no
Blacks in it." 253 The court found no evidence of racial bias in that state-
ment.2 54 But, during the remand hearing where all the jurors were examined
individually by defense and prosecution counsel, the jury foreman for the
first time recounted having heard other racial references by a female juror
during deliberations. 255 He said: "every once in a while I heard the one lady
discuss the black guy, get him off the street, he's a drug dealer. Any black
guy who would be in an area at that time with this, he's guilty (emphasis
added)." 25 6 Though no other juror recalled these remarks being made during
deliberations, one juror expressed her surprise when the jury foreman posed
the question: "do you feel he's guilty because he's black?" 257 Taking that
statement as corroboration, the court ruled that the female juror had injected
her own prejudice into the deliberations that any African American who
would be in the area is guilty, and ordered a new trial.258 (Note - implicit in
this court's decision is the strong possibility that the female juror's statement
was audible only to the jury foreperson).
The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Jackson259 managed to keep the
delicate issue of racially-charged statements in their proper context. The
case also shows that curative steps such as a show of contriteness, a retrac-
248 Id.
249 See id. at 22.
2 5 0 Id. at 21.
251 690 A.2d 917 (1996).2 52 Id. at 919.
253 Id.
254 Id.
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tion, or an explanation should also be taken into consideration as the judge
develops a full contextual understanding of communications among jurors.
In that case, the defendant, an African-American who was charged with sex-
ual assault, filed a motion for a new trial based on post-verdict revelations
by the jury foreperson about comments by jurors that focused on the defen-
dant's racial identity. 260 Those statements led her to believe that he "did not
receive a fair and impartial trial in this matter." 261 The court quickly dis-
missed a statement by a Japanese woman juror who had referred to the de-
fendant as "colored," and remarked that he had such a "pretty" and "non-
Black" wife, because the statements were made after deliberations were
over.2 62 Taking a closer look at the statement, "That's the way they are"
when discussing the effects of alcohol, the court nonetheless concluded that
the juryperson's immediate challenge to the statement, the denial by the
speaker that she had meant any racial overtone, the negative reaction to the
statement by the other jurors, the foreperson's caution to the jury not to con-
sider race in jury deliberations, the fact that no other racially tinged state-
ments were made, and the compelling evidence of guilt meant that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the statement could not
have affected the verdict. 263
State v. Hunter264 shows another court's sensitivity in addressing the
difficult issue of race. The Hunter defendant was convicted of kidnapping
and armed robbery. 265 One week after the trial, the defense attorney con-
tacted the only black person on the jury and filed a motion for a new trial
alleging juror misconduct during deliberations, based on information given
by her. 26 6 In an in camera hearing, a juror named Richardson told the judge
about three incidents that occurred during deliberations. 267 According to
Richardson, a juror named Christine used the word "n****r" when referring
to some testimony given at trial.2 68 However, the court determined that
Christine had misquoted a statement a witness had made during testimony.269
Instead of referring to the statement, "We'll let the black boys work this
weekend," Christine had misquoted this witness, saying, "Let the n*****s
work." 270 After making that statement, Christine appeared to catch herself,
covered her mouth with her hand and said "Oop[s]." 2 7 1 Nonetheless, Rich-
ardson testified that this upset her.2 7 2 The second statement also involved
Christine and Richardson who appeared to know each other. Apparently
260 Id. at 74.
261 Id. at 76.
262 See id. at 80.
263 Id. at 81-88.
26 463 S.E.2d 314 (S.C. 1995).










two of their nieces were planning to move to Columbia, South Carolina to
live together. 27 3 During deliberations, Christine said, "if [the defendant] got
out, supposing he got out and killed some of your family, your niece might
be killed."2 74 Richardson perceived the statement as a threat to her family's
safety. 275 The third allegation involved statements by jurors who gathered
around Richardson and told her, "you know he's guilty, you know he's
guilty."2 76 Richardson testified that throughout the deliberations she thought
the defendant was innocent. 2 77
According to the South Carolina Supreme Court, neither the statements
uttered nor the conduct revealed racial bias toward the defendant. The use of
the word "n****r" did not refer to the defendant nor Richardson when they
were made, Christine was immediately aware of its inappropriateness, and
no evidence that other jurors agree with any racially impermissible senti-
ment was produced. 278 Regarding the perceived threat to Richardson's fam-
ily, the court ruled that what was said could not have fairly be interpreted as
a threat.2 79 And, finally, the court ruled that Richardson's claim that she was
"touched on the shoulders" by other jurors was insufficient to show that she
was coerced into changing her vote.280 The court also noted that Richardson
never contacted the judge during proceedings about any of those things, de-
spite the fact that she was familiar with the court system, and that, when
polled, she indicated that guilty was her verdict.28 '
CONCLUSION
Jury bias against racial, gender, ethnic, religious, and other minorities
has existed throughout the Nation's history. Though the criminal justice sys-
tem has come a long way from the days when 500 out of 500 white defend-
ants were acquitted of killing black people by all-white juries, the system
continues to be plagued by racial and other biases. The Pedia-Rodriguez
decision represents a significant step forward, as the system strives to pro-
vide equal treatment to all. While it may affect a comparatively small num-
ber of cases at the onset282 , Peia-Rodriguez may nonetheless provide the all-




6 Id. at 315-16.





282 An electronic search of cases from all state and federal jurisdictions of keywords perti-
nent to Pefia-Rodriguez (606(b), overt, racial, and bias) yields only forty-one relevant cases.
Search was performed on January 27, 2018, using the Thomson Reuters Westlaw online legal
database.
33Spring 2018
34 Harvard Latinx Law Review Vol. 21
ations. Whether intended or not, the Court's timely decision in Pedla-Rodri-
guez may be the catalyst for a broader and more effective discussion of bias
in a jury system still badly in need of repairs.
